This paper describes how and why the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings were developed. A brief overview about the need for the guidelines, as well as the context and background, are included. Also, a discussion on the process of developing them with an eye towards identifying key issues and obstacles, and the strategies used to manage these issues and enable constructive collaboration, is provided. Also included are the processes of building positive networks and relations across agencies and sub¢elds. Finally, there is a brief overview of how the Task Force worked and approached some of the issues that have been hotly contested in the ¢eld.
Armed con£icts, war and natural disasters can cause substantial psychological and social su¡ering to a¡ected populations. 1 Worldwide, there has been an increased awareness of the importance of responding with mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in emergency situations, to care for the needs of people that are a¡ected. However, despite this growing awareness, and the inclination to respond that has accompanied it, the mental health and psychosocial support ¢eld is still developing and has lacked a uni¢ed clarity about how to respond in the most appropriate and e¡ective ways. In 2007, an important step towards remedying this situation was taken when the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings were published. These guidelines are a milestone for the MHPSS ¢eld because they are the ¢rst inter-agency consensus about what are the essential ¢rst steps to be taken in an emergency. This paper tells the story of how a young, divided ¢eld is creating consensus and building a more comprehensive, contextually appropriate response to emergencies.
Why the guidelines were needed
As little as ¢ve years ago, there was no consensus among aid agencies in the ¢eld of MHPSS in emergency settings. Without a framework, based on inter-agency consensus, there was little basis for e¡ective coordination of practice and advocacy, a weak foundation for e¡orts to train and prepare humanitarian workers, and signi¢cantly elevated risks that well intentioned e¡orts could cause harm. Therefore, these guidelines should be seen as a collective e¡ort to address these important issues.
Do No Harm
The ¢eld of MHPSS in emergency settings has little empirical evidence regarding what Wessells & van Ommeren e¡ective interventions are, due to the relatively young age of the ¢eld (Betancourt & Williams, 2008; Mollica et al., 2004; Batniji, van Ommeren, & Saraceno, 2006; Patel et al., 2007) . This weak base of evidence, combined with a lack of consensus about the appropriate practices, has enabled ill conceived or poorly implemented MHPSS to occur -thereby causing harm. For example, in Sri Lanka a year after the 2004 tsunami, a door to door survey revealed that there were 27 non governmental organisations (NGOs) working in a rural community of 50 families. It was found that the presence of so many external helpers had undermined older community practices where, inthe past, it was neighbours who had helped each other in emergencies (IASC, 2007) . Harm may also occur through the use of methods that are inappropriate within the socio cultural context. Following the attacks of Serb paramilitaries on Kosovar Albanians, large numbers of Kosovars £ed to neighbouring countries such as Albania. InTirana, the ¢rst author spoke with a well intentioned psychotherapist from the U.S., who had never worked during a humanitarian emergency, had no understanding of the local culture, yet felt' called'to help. Sadly, he set up a counselling tent to conduct therapy for rape survivors. He seemed oblivious to the fact that for a woman to enter his tent would stigmatize her as someone who was raped, as well as raise the risks that she might be killed in order to preserve' family honour. ' The guidelines can therefore, in part, be seen as an e¡ort to prevent these problems, as well as the wider array of other Do No Harm issues in MHPSS emergency response (Boothby et al., 2006; Bracken et al., 1995; van Ommeren et al., 2005; Wessells, 2008) . Among these other issues are: over reliance on outsider approaches; the misuse of potentially harmful, yet popular, methods such as critical incident stress debrie¢ng; giving privileges to particular groups over others; over prescription of anti-anxiety drugs; conduct of duplicate assessments; lengthy delays between assessments and response; and the habit of employing under trained, undersupervised counsellors. Additionally, what is not done in MHPSS can be as problematic as what is done. Too often quality controls, social and legal protections, participatory approaches, appropriate grounding of support in the local cultures, attention to severe mental illness, minimizing harm related to alcohol and drugs, and the willingness to identify and build upon the support and resilience that the a¡ected people already have, are missing from MHPSS e¡orts.
A Divided Field
The ¢eld needed positive guidance to enable it to mature beyond it's divisions. Over the past ¢fteen years, the MHPSS ¢eld has been polarized into multiple camps, with distinct, conceptual and ideological di¡erences between them (Betancourt & Williams,2008; Boothby et al.,2006; Bracken et al., 1995; Galappatti, 2003; Silove et al., 2000; van Ommeren et al., 2005) . In the health sector there were two competing approaches. One used a vertical, medical model, focused on traumatic stress symptoms and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This approach often entailed the use of freestanding supports such as counselling, psychotherapy and medication. The other approach used a public health model that considered all mental disorders and placed priority on all severe mental disorders, regardless of whether these disorders were severe trauma induced depression or preexisting psychoses to be managed through general health services and/or general mental health services (WHO, 2003) . In the protection/social/community services/social Developing inter-agency guidelines on mental health and psychosocial support in emergency settings Intervention 2008, Volume 6, Number 3/4, Page 199 -218 welfare sector, which includes social workers, child protection practitioners, and many other paraprofessionals, there were also at least two di¡ering approaches. The ¢rst was a holistic, community based approach that entailed strengthening anduse of non clinical community supports such as: women's support groups; child friendly spaces; means of reuniting family members who had been separated; and livelihood support to alleviate distress stemming from di⁄cult economic circumstances. The second, although less common, followed the medical model described above and focused on counselling for traumatic stress and PTSD. Typically, these di¡erent camps competed for funding and rarely collaborated in emergency situations. In essence, workers in the ¢eld adhered each to their own approaches, o¡ered competing analyses grounded in divergent theories, valued di¡erent types of evidence and often showed marked disrespect for opposing views. In the absence of a solid base of evidence, dogma often dominated within these groups, limiting e¡orts to collaborate. Worse yet, this dogma generated absurd ideas, such as: everyone is traumatized. Or alternatively: no one is traumatized. These divisions contributed heavily to poor coordination across approaches, resulting in fragmented services, a lack of comprehensive supports, and startling inconsistency. In some emergency responses, such as in Bosnia, there was extensive use of clinical interventions, yet too little community based support. In other emergency responses, as in Northern Uganda, the opposite pattern prevailed. The net e¡ect of these problems was to deprive a¡ected people of essential support in their hour of greatest need. In addition, MHPSS was often ghettoized, forced to work in isolation from other emergencies responses.
However, by 2004, MHPSS had become a common feature of many emergency humanitarian response e¡orts (Miller & Rasco, 2004) , but it was still not regarded as a priority. Many humanitarian aid workers believed, and often still do, that actions related to MHPSS are second or third tier interventions that come only after meeting the basic needs for security, health, food, water/sanitation, and shelter. The Asian tsunami of December 2004, more than any other single event, repositioned MHPSS as atop priority fromthe very beginning of an emergency response. As seen in the global media, vast numbers of people, in multiple countries, saw their loved ones, homes, and livelihoods swept away in a matter of minutes. The global audience saw a glimpse of the enormity of su¡ering associated with psychological anguish, social disruption and forced life transformations caused by the disaster. It clearly showed that a¡ected people needed MHPSS immediately.This highlighted the need for guidelines that outlined how to provide that immediate support.
Establishing the Task Force
Changes in the humanitarian system and its policies are often made through the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC), which includes the heads of many UN and non-UN agencies, including NGO consortia. The IASC promotes humanitarian coordination, develops humanitarian policies, and plays a key role in reforms so as to make the humanitarian system more accountable, e⁄-cient, and predictable. It was natural to work through the IASC because it had previously created Task Forces to develop global intersectoral guidelines on HIV/AIDS and gender based violence. A concrete plan to begin the process of developing IASC Guidelines on MHPSS Task Force would only be open to IASC agencies, which includes the 100s of NGO members of NGO consortia that are part of the IASC. The result of this, however, was to exclude academic institutions, professional organisations and many grassroots organisations.Therefore, the need to reach out and consult with these groups was apparent. This was done extensively during the peer review process. Although excluding groups from membership clearly had its drawbacks, it didensure that theTask Force: (a) consisted of agencies with broad international experience in implementing programmes; (b) steered clear from abstract academic discussion; and (c) was free of the in£uence of special interests from any one particular professional organisation.
The Task Force was responsible for writing consensus based guidelines. Although consensus on MHPSS was emerging (van Ommeren et al., 2005) , there was no de¢ned consensus about the top priorities. Fortunately, there was an increasing agreement about what to do early on during emergency response (van Ommeren et al., 2005) . This agreement, albeit incomplete, had been brought about by developments such as the inclusion of a section on MHPSS in the 2004 edition of the Sphere Handbook (Sphere Project, 2004) . Across a broad spectrum of MHPSS practitioners, there was a widespread sense that it was time to develop guidelines to help systematize the ¢eld, enable e¡ective coordination, identify useful practices, £ag potentially harmful practices, and clarify how di¡erent approaches to MHPSS complement one another. If this sense of 'readiness' was crucial, so too was the construction of an inclusive, systematic process for developing guidelines that diverse agencies could agree.
Developing the guidelines
Following the establishmentof theTask Force, this group worked in a concerted manner over the next two years to develop the guidelines, which were ¢nalized in February, 2007 and launched in Geneva in September, 2007. The discussion below outlines the strategies and processes used in developing the guidelines. Table 1 provides a brief chronology of the main steps involved.
Key Strategies
Three key challenges in the work of the Task Force were:
(1) the broad scope of the ¢eld of MHPSS, which requires technical expertise of diverse kinds; (2) the polarizations described above in the ¢eld and the associated risk of getting bogged down in divisive debates; and (3) the lack of relationships and collaboration between practitioners in the health and protection sectors and across a wide spectrum of agencies in the ¢eld of MHPSS.
To manage these challenges, the Task Force used numerous strategies, that in most cases, were developed collectively by various Task Force members. Inclusive approach As mentioned above, the Task Force's membership could have included each of the hundreds of agency members of the IASC and its consortia. Yet agency members had to be recruited to actually join the Task Force. Technically, it was necessary to reach beyond one camp and to draw on the comparative advantage and technical strengths of di¡erent agencies. It was clear from the outset that the acceptance and legitimacy of the guidelines required membership of numerous agencies, to balance and integrate elements from the health and protection sectors, as well as other sectors. Another key decision taken early on was to recruit into the Task Force a diverse array of agencies that had been highly active in di¡er-ent ¢eld settings. They were represented by seasoned practitioners who came mainly from the health and protection sectors, and also from diverse backgrounds such as: psychology, psychiatry, and social work. These agencies were identi¢ed through a process of networking, consultation, and outreach among UNagencies and NGOs, for example through Inter Action. Developing Invariably, the discussion returned to issues of practice. More than any other strategy, keeping the focus on practice avoided dwelling on divisions, and made it possible to achieve consensus. SomeTask Force members wanted to start the discussion by developing a set of principles to inform the guidelines'development. However, it was decided not to go that route, as articulating principles, although important, is an abstract process and can be contentious in a ¢eld burdened with dogma. Therefore, it was decided to focus the discussions on practical actions, and to record principles whenever Task Force members spontaneously articulated them.The articulation of these principles evolved and can be found in the introductory chapter of the guidelines. Face to face meetings Face to face meetings played a pivotal role in the work of the Task Force. It was at these meetings thatTask Force members either got to know each other or to renew old bonds, to develop a common vision, and to build a sense of teamwork. The building of human relationships across sectors and agencies was a core part of the foundation for the Task Force and one of its enduring accomplishments. Members seem to have understood from the start that a division into 'tribes,' competitive agency positioning, or excessively harsh exchanges would undermine any movement toward a consensus. Fortunately, norms of collaboration and respect evolved early in the process and gained in strength with each successful step of collaboration. Face to face discussions were also vital to discuss complex issues in an open, forthright manner. Although theTask Force conducted a large amount of it's business by email, they avoided handling most contentious issues by email, as it lacks contextual cues that enable accurate interpretation, as well as the social in£uences that encourages moderation. Discussions in person enabled vigorous exchanges, including some debates, which were very useful in clarifying technical issues and also areas of continuing disagreement. The participatory process of the meetings also enabled di¡erent participants to exercise developing particular ideas and to facilitate agreement on key issues. Equally important were the informal discussions that occurred in breaks and over meals. In these spaces, participants often probed issues further, and built relationships that could withstand disagreements over particular issues. Shared vision, common vocabulary The participants came together with a strong, common goal of developing technically accurate, global guidelines that would enable comprehensive, quality supports for a¡ected populations. In the pursuit of this goal, the participants developed a common vision, which perhaps is best expressed through six principles (see Chapter 1 of the guidelines for details) that are listed below.
(1) Human rights and equity MHPSS should promote the rights of all a¡ected people; promote equity among all a¡ected groups, and avoid the discrimination that often harms a¡ected people. Figure 1) . A small percentage, who experience intolerable su¡ering and may have signi¢cant di⁄culties in basic daily functioning, immediately need access to clinical psychological, psychiatric, or other highly specialized support. Most people, however, will cope and recover well through access to local, non formal support, provided that the public wellbeing is protected through the reestablishment of security, adequate governance and services that meet basic survival needs. In between these extremes are people who have been a¡ected by disruptions of, or separations from,keyfamilyandcommunitysupport and who will bene¢t from e¡orts such as family tracing and reuni¢cation, communal healing ceremonies, formal and non formal education, livelihood activities, and the activation of social networks. In between these extremes are also people who need access to focused, non clinical supports, such as access to psychological ¢rst aid for acute trauma induced distress.
In addition to enabling the multiple, proportionate layers needed for building comprehensive supports, this layered system proved useful in quieting concerns that ones' own area of work was somehow less important than others. This layered system provides a 'home' for di¡erent sorts of MHPSS supports, emphasizes their complementarities, and underscores the importance of coordination and referrals across levels. Of note, this layered system is displayed in the form of an intervention pyramid in the introductory chapter of the guidelines. Such pyramids
Developing inter-agency guidelines on mental health and psychosocial support in emergency settings Intervention 2008, Volume 6, Number 3/4, are common in the ¢eld (for example, Green et al., 2003) . The pyramid in the guidelines was built after reviewing about ten such pyramids available in the mental health and psychosocial literature. Along with the need for a shared vision, came the need for a common vocabulary that would bridge various subgroups. Although the terms mental health and psychosocial support are closely related and overlap conceptually, they re£ect di¡erent, yet complementary, approaches for many aid workers. Aid agencies working outside the health sector tend to speak of supporting psychosocial wellbeing. Health sector agencies tend to speak of mental health, yet historically have also used the terms ' psychosocial rehabilitation' and ' psychosocial treatment'to describe non-biological interventions for people with mental disorders (WHO, 2001) . Exact de¢nitions of these terms vary between, and within, aid organisations, disciplines and countries, and this variation often fuels confusion and debate in the ¢eld (Galappatti, 2003 
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responses have been ful¢lled. The Action Sheets then o¡er speci¢c guidance on how to accomplish particular recommended minimum responses. Table 3 shows the minimum response part of the overall matrix, with the titles of each of the action sheets. The Task Force made two key decisions regarding its Matrix of Interventions. First, it decided to use many of the matrix categories of the previous IASC Guidelines (mentioned above). Besides promoting consistency across the various guidelines, this approach was consistent with the charge to the Task Force to develop inter sectoral guidelines, as well as the idea that MHPSS is not something done only by clinicians and protection workers. Aid workers, in sectors such as food security and nutrition, shelter and site planning, education, and water/sanitation, also have a responsibility to promote MHPSS by virtue of the way in which they do their work. Second, the Task Force decided to adapt the matrices developed by previous IASC e¡orts. The most signi¢cant adaptation to the MHPSS topic was the addition of a row entitled ' community mobilization and support. ' The Action Sheets under this heading, in particular, operationalise principles of participation and building on local resources.They outline how one can facilitate community participation and ownership of the aid e¡ort, how to build on local resources to strengthen community supports, and how to enable the participation of marginalized people. Having community mobilization and support sit at the same level and prominence in the guidelines as Health Services or Education ensured balance, and avoided the extremes such as those inherent in a medical model.
Developing action sheets
The development of Action Sheets was time intensive, consultative, and systematic. The process entailed a leading role taken by di¡erent agencies that also took primary responsibility for drafting a particular (and in some cases, several) Action Sheets relevant to their own speci¢c expertise. The agencies that played a leading role were encouraged to reach down to grassroots level in their own networks, bringing forward insights from diverse contexts and cultural systems. In some cases, such as the Action Sheet on social considerations inthe provisionof water and sanitation, the Task Force lacked the relevant agency expertise and therefore recruited an agency (in this case, Oxfam) to play the lead role. In a few cases (for example, legal protection and training), external consultants were hiredby particular agencies to do the main drafting and revision. This shared leadership approach and the investmentby member agencies of signi¢cant amounts of time and resources testi¢es to the highly collaborative nature of the work done by theTask Force. To achieve high levels of technical accuracy, each Action Sheet was subjected to ¢ve rounds of review. Task Force members conducted three reviews, and the ¢rst and fourth revisions were reviewed externally, as well as internally. For the external review, the Action Sheets were translated into French and Spanish and sent to hundreds of practitioners, academics, and professional associations worldwide, with a request for their peer review and input. (The matrix was translated and circulated in French, Spanish and Arabic.) This robust external peer review engaged a much wider range of perspectives than existed on the Task Force and helped theTask Force to avoidbecoming too isolated, or entrapped in their own discourse. Each co chair assumed responsibility for overseeing review of half the action sheets. This entailed checking whether all external peer review comments were appropriately addressed, and making technical suggestions where these seemed indicated. Each co chair also reviewed, and often edited, the other co chair's suggestions before these were sent back to the authors. In addition, many agencies organized their own peer reviews of action sheets that they had written. One agency hired the previous editor of the prestigious journal Culture Medicine and Psychiatry to review and comment on the entire document. The reviewers included academics from 29 universities (see page v of the guidelines). Their critical, science-informed reviews ensured that the ¢nal text of the guidelines is consistent with our current, scienti¢c knowledge basis. Also crucial were the reviews by people from di¡erent backgrounds and regions. Their insights ensured that the guidelines did not re£ect only the ideas from a few countries. To enable inputs from partners from low income countries, a global consultation with national MHPSS workers from those countries was conducted in Geneva, with the results used to make substantive revisions. Similarly, the guidelines bene¢ted from a peer review workshop, spontaneously organized in Sri Lanka by its national Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies.
Controversial issues
The Task Force analyzed many contentious, complex issues that admit no easy answers. Although space limits preclude a full discussion of these issues, it is worthwhile considering how the Task Force considered a few charged issues, and these are discussed below. Coordination Inter agency coordination is at the heart of e¡ective emergency response. A recurrent problem, however, has been the creation of separate MHPSS coordination Developing inter-agency guidelines on mental health and psychosocial support in emergency settings Intervention 2008, Volume 6, Number 3/4, Page 199 -218 groups that neither coordinate, nor communicate, with each other. Usually, a Ministry of Health establishes a mental health coordination group that re£ects the emphases of the health sector, whereas self help and community led supports are coordinated independently through the protection sector. TheTask Force discussedthese issues duringa period of humanitarian reforms that created the cluster system for delivering humanitarian support in emergencies. Typically, MHPSS work in emergencies is facilitated by agencies working in multiple clusters, in particular the Health and Protection Clusters. Animated discussions occurred around the question of who should have the primary responsibility for MHPSS coordination. Some members argued that to give the Health Cluster the primary MHPSS responsibility would result in a narrow approach and potential overuse of the medical model. Other Task Force members argued that that if the coordination responsibility were handed to the Protection Cluster, people with preexisting or disaster induced mental disorders would be ignored. There were also members who suggested that either the Health Cluster or the Protecion Cluster might be a good home for MHPSS coordination. There was additional concern that asking both the Protection and the Health Clusters to share the coordination responsibility would produce confusion and poor accountability. In the end, the importance of multi sectoral coordination rose as the highest priority. A consensus emerged that the guidelines should encourage the establishment of a single, overarching coordination group. They do not, however, specify where this group sits within the overall humanitarian coordination system. In essence, these decisions are left to the local actors in the ¢eld. (Apfel & Simon, 1996; Derluyn et al., 2004; Green et al., 2003; Marsella et al., 1994 Marsella et al., , 1996 Wilson & Drozdek, 2004) . Other analysts, however, have questioned, in varying degrees, the appropriateness of this emphasis (Bracken et al., 1995; Stein et al., 2007; Wessells, 2006; Wessely, 2003) . There is clearly no consensus in this area (van Ommeren et al., 2005) . A signi¢cant question for many members was how the Task Force would view the emphasis on trauma, and how it would dispose itself toward PTSD and other forms of mental illness.
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Within the Task Force discussions there was, perhaps surprisingly, little interest in a focus on traumatic stress. Many practitioners, especially those from the health sector, had previously focused on traumatic stress in emergencies but had slowly moved away. We believe that this is not due to a ' selection bias' of the Task Force members. More likely, we believed it re£ects a tendency of highly experienced international emergency practitioners -those who have actively worked for extended periods in international disasters -to see traumatic stress as only one of numerous issues. Less experienced workers are more likely to see trauma as the key issue. Health professionals on the Task Force pointed out that, although traumatic stress and PTSD can be signi¢cant problems, grief and depression are often greater problems that often receive little attention. Those with a public health perspective were concerned that trauma is too frequently approached in a singular (vertical/stand alone) manner that fragments the mental health care system as a whole. According to this approach, attention is needed on a much wider array of mental health issues covering both preexisting and disaster induced mental disorders, including mood disorders, substance use disorders, and acute and chronic psychoses, among others. Due to the awareness that categories of mental health and illness are partially culturally constructed, quite a fewTask Force members emphasized the importance of also considering indigenous knowledge and practices that diverge fromWestern categories and practices.There was widespread agreement that severely or chronically mentally ill people are often invisible in emergencies, as well as being at very high risk. Therefore, those working on MHPSS cannot ignore them.This discussion led to consensus that the top layer of the intervention pyramid includes interventions, not only for severely traumatized people, but also for those having other severe mental health problems requiring specialized supports. Lively discussion explored the complexities of surveys of mental disorders in emergency contexts. Despite being published in prestigious journals, few practitioners seemed to hold them as credible. Members pointed out that too often surveys entail the use of scales that have not been validated for emergency a¡ected contexts, in which reports of high distress may not necessarily imply mental disorders. Task Force members working outside the health sector were particularly concerned with issues of the cultural validity of the constructs measured. Most health sector workers saw the cultural validity of constructs such as PTSD and mood disorder as less of an issue. Yet, they noted that the reactions seen during the ¢rst month of an emergency often tend to improve over time and usually do not convert into full blown mental disorder. This is especially common when people experience social supports and basic needs are met. Those in the protection sector pointed out that reported severe distress might result not from traumatic experiences, but from di⁄cult environmental conditions arising from current living arrangements or loss of livelihoods, etc. For example, refugees and internally displaced persons often say that their greatest sources of distress is the lack of privacy in camps, fear of being sexually assaulted when they go to the latrines or collect ¢rewood, and/or not knowing the whereabouts of loved ones. Nonetheless, most members agreed that severe, acute trauma induced distress and any subsequent severe disorder remains an issue for a minority of disaster survivors. As a result of its' mandate on minimum response, the Task Force agreed that the Developing inter-agency guidelines on mental health and psychosocial support in emergency settings Intervention 2008, Volume 6, Number 3/4, Page 199 -218 guidelines would include as essential supports: (a) psychological ¢rst aid to people with acute trauma induced distress and (b) care for people with severe mental disorders, including severe (highly disabling) presentations of PTSD, by trained and supervised health sta¡. However, care for mild and moderate mental disorders (including mild and moderate presentations of PTSD) was relegated to the more comprehensive response, i.e. to be implemented after the population has access to essential supports. Part of the comprehensive response, indeed, is the building of a community mental health system that includes care for PTSD, alongside that of many other disorders.
Conclusion
The development of the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings led to concrete guidance for all humanitarian actors on how to organize the necessary supports, in a collaborative manner that respects the Do No Harm imperative. As explained, in part, in some of the papers in this issue, the guidelines are now in use by multiple agencies in countries such as Sri Lanka, Peru, Colombia, Philippines, Kenya, Jordan, Syria, Myanmar, and China, among many others.We strongly encourage readers to support the use of the guidelines in their own agencies and especially by the coordination groups in emergencies. Coordination groups will want to use the guidelines as a checklist to identify whether appropriate minimum responses are being implemented in various regions, thereby identifying potential gaps and improving planning. A coordinated, intersectoral approach is essential to address the diverse mental health needs and psy- 
